Selon le rapport  « Investigation Houston : Criminal investigation into ING Bank N.V - Statement of Facts and Conclusionsof the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service : 

"The following shortcomings were discovered :

1)    the absence or incompleteness of CDD files ;
2)    the assignment of incorrect risk classifications ;
3)    not having the (periodic) CDD review process in order ;
4)    not terminating business relationships on a timely basis ;
5)    the insufficient functioning of the post-transaction monitoring system ;
6)    classifying clients into the wrong segments;
7)    insufficient availability of qualitative and quantitative personnel capacity." (p. 9).

Sur les divers reproches :

-    "Missing or incomplete CDD files : ... For example, client identification and verification data and their UBOs were missing, possibly including PEPs, and ING NL was not, or not sufficiently, aware of its clients' activities.... What played a role here was that ING NL wanted to offer its clients an attractive acceptance process that did not take sufficient account of the risks of doing business with undesirable clients. " (p.9)

-    " Assigning incorrect risk classifications :... No underlying documentation was requested or, where this did happen, no action or insufficient action was taken if clients did not provide the requested information. " (p.10)

-    " Shortcomings in the CDD review process : ING NL did not check during the relationship whether the information known about the client was still correct or whether, for example, there was a change in ownership structure or in business activities. ING NL also often failed to take account of important signals which, according to their own policy, should have led to a CDD review. This concerned signals such as requests for information about clients coming from investigative authorities or signals coming from the company's own transaction monitoring system" (p. 10) 

-    "Not terminating business relationships in a timely manner :.... Because ING NL did not have the exit process in order, it was possible that, despite an insufficient and incomplete client due diligence (for example because information about the UBO was not disclosed), it did not sever ties with the client in a timely way." (p. 10)

-    " Insufficient functioning of the transaction monitoring system :
•    The monitoring system settings, as a result of which many accounts were only monitored to a limited extent ;
•    The monitoring system settings which, for certain categories of money laundering signals, limited the system to a predetermined (in some cases very limited) daily number of alerts ;
•    The fact that, under the aforementioned settings, only percentage deviations in respect of the account history were taken into account in the selection and sorting of accounts for further investigation and not the absolute size of the transactions ;
•    Monitoring took place at account level and not at client level ;
•    Incomplete input of relevant data into the monitoring system for proper (and risk-based) monitoring ;
•    Insufficient (qualitative and quantitative) personnel capacity for handling alerts." (p.11)  

-    " Incorrect client segmentation : The investigation showed that ING NL did not have sufficient control over the correct 'segmentation' of its clients. This was due to the fact that ING NL based the segmentation process on the client's information, and that during the business relationship, ING NL did not monitor whether clients had been assigned to the right client segment, for example by checking during the relationship whether the turnover was still appropriate for the client segment in question. " (p.11)

-    "Lack of qualitative and quantitative personnel capacity : ING NL had struggled with personnel capacity problems for many years in the departments relevant to compliance with the AML/CTF Act, such as the departments that conducted CDD reviews and departments where employees worked on investigating signals of money laundering from the transaction monitoring system. Not enough staff capacity was made available to carry out the work and also to solve the problems that had become known within the organisation in an expedient and structural way. Also, the available staff did not always have the necessary knowledge and experience to do the work" (p. 12)

-    "Causes of the shortcomings : Insufficient attention & priority... Business over compliance... No sustainable solutions.... Dysfunctioning of internal controls and fragmentation..... Absence of an escalation culture" (p. 13)

Sur la responsabilité pénale de l'entreprise :

"The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) sets a high bar for prosecuting individuals for directing offenses such as those identified at ING NL; not only must there be proof that these individuals knew of offences, but these persons must also have consciously contributed to the committing of criminal offenses by the organisation or consciously neglected to prevent them. The investigation showed that, in the period from 2010 to 2016, several individual current and former employees and managers at ING NL made mistakes. However, the NPPS is of the opinion that the investigation has not produced sufficient evidence to make criminal accusations against these individuals. The NPPS is therefore attributing the offenses to the organisation as a whole." (p. 21)

Enfin, sur la possibilité de conclure un accord pour mettre un terme à la poursuite pénale :

" Before the start of the hearing, the NPPS may set out one or more conditions which must be satisfied to avoid criminal prosecution for crimes (misdrijf) punishable by imprisonment of no more than six years and for minor offenses (overtredingen)  (Article 74 of the Dutch Criminal Code). In other words, the settlement is an option provided for by law to settle criminal cases outside the courts. 
In this case, given the size of the settlement amount, it is considered a high settlement. It is also a special settlement at a time when, among other things, the general functioning of the financial and economic sector is at stake. Such a settlement is subject to the "Designation Order for High Settlements and Special Settlements" (Aanwijzing hoge transacties en bijzondere transacties) 

The aforementioned designation order includes the basic principle: "not to settle in such cases (but to submit them to the courts), unless there is a very good reason for doing so". In the Houston criminal investigation there are good reasons for settling, namely :
-    ING NL publicly acknowledges and regrets the mistakes made ;
-    ING NL cooperated in the criminal investigation and investigated the matter internally and the outcomes have been reported to the NPPS ;
-    ING NL will continue to actively allow the NPPS to investigate possible criminal offenses arising from shortcomings in the FEC CDD policy to which the settlement relates ;
-    ING NL, under the supervision of DNB, has developed and implemented a remediation plan. ING NL also provided the NPPS with insight into the progress of this remediation plan throughout the criminal investigation ;
-    As part of this settlement, ING NL is taking responsibility for criminal offenses committed over a period of several years.

For these reasons, the NPPS considers a settlement to be more effective than court proceedings." (p. 22).